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Hegemonic Representation in *Detik.com*'s News on Disinformation, Defamation, and Hate Speech (DFK) in the 2025 Demonstrations: A Critical Discourse Analysis

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Abstract

This study examines the discourse construction surrounding disinformasi, fitnah, kebencian (DFK; disinformation, defamation, and hate speech) *in the online media outlet Detik.com following the demonstrations over DPR RI (the Indonesian House of Representatives') allowances in August–September 2025. It aims to reveal how Detik.com uses evaluative language strategies to legitimize the state's moral authority in regulating the public digital sphere. Applying a qualitative approach with Fairclough's (2010) three-dimensional Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), this study analyzes five Detik.com news articles concerning the takedown of live-streaming content and the prohibition of secondary accounts. The findings are interpreted through Gramsci's theory of hegemony, as adapted by Ives (2004). At the micro level, negatively loaded lexical choices and deontic modality construe public digital expression as disorder requiring correction, while transitivity positions the state as the agent responsible for restoring order. At the meso level, these patterns correspond to a discursive practice reliant almost exclusively on government sources, with the same framing redistributed from national to regional readerships. At the macro level, read through Gramsci's concept of hegemony, this pattern is consistent with a "war of position" in which consent is pursued through cultural and institutional means rather than direct coercion. Taken together, these findings suggest that DFK discourse in mainstream media has the potential to function as a political instrument for the discursive disciplining of social movements, although confirming its actual societal effects would require further audience-reception research.*

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Introduction

The wave of public demonstrations in Indonesia between August and September 2025 was triggered by widespread public criticism of the increase in allowances for members of Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Indonesia (DPR RI, the Indonesian House of Representatives), a policy that drew backlash amid ongoing economic hardship faced by the public (BBC News Indonesia, 2025). Throughout the protests, social media platforms such as TikTok, Facebook, Instagram, and X became central arenas for the circulation of information, as users relied on them to share real-time updates, express opinions, and mobilize support (Raghavan, 2026). The rapid dissemination of information through online news and social media during the protests had both positive and negative effects. While it facilitated broader public participation and allowed information to circulate quickly among citizens, it also posed challenges related to the spread of misleading or harmful content, including *disinformasi, fitnah, kebencian* (DFK, disinformation, defamation, and hate speech), as reported in the news coverage of the protests. This duality reflects the characteristics of social media as an open, fast, and participatory communication space that allows users to produce and distribute content without significant barriers (Osatuyi, 2013). In response to the risks created by this openness, existing laws and regulations in Indonesia provide mechanisms for addressing various forms of problematic online content. Media coverage, in turn, continues to frame such content in relation to concerns about social order and democratic principles (Zahirah & Slam, 2025). At the same time, these regulatory measures raise questions about their implications for the space available for public discourse on digital platforms.

The narratives surrounding DFK during the 2025 demonstrations, which emphasized threats to social order, attributed responsibility to digital platforms, and presented regulation as necessary to protect democracy, were also reflected in reports published by Detik.com. These articles focused on the government's response to the circulation of false content that allegedly incited unrest during the demonstrations. Angga Raka Prabowo, Wakil Menteri Komunikasi dan Digital (Wamenkomdigi, Deputy Minister of Communications and Digital Affairs), stated that the spread of such content had "stirred up hatred," and "clouded public aspirations", framing the removal of harmful information by digital platforms to prevent further disruption. This position was further supported by Komisi I DPR (House of Representatives Commission I), which argued that digital platforms such as TikTok and Meta should be held systematically accountable rather than allowed to respond only reactively to DFK. In addition, these efforts by the Komdigi were reinforced by the DPR's proposal to prohibit the use of second accounts on social media as a preventive measure against the spread of DFK (Anggrainy, 2025). Rather than framing the situation as a matter of public debate or freedom of expression, these articles primarily focused on the risks posed by DFK while emphasizing the responsibility of digital platforms and the need for regulatory control. This framing foregrounded regulation and social stability, while giving less attention to alternative perspectives, including concerns regarding greater state involvement in the digital spaces. As a result, the regulatory perspective was presented more prominently, while differing interpretations of the issue remained less visible in the coverage.

In the context of digital public discourse, news media play a crucial role in shaping how issues of DFK are understood and discussed. News coverage may place greater emphasis on certain perspectives, including those of state authorities and regulatory bodies, while giving less attention to alternative viewpoints. Therefore, this study aims to investigate how dominant discourse on DFK is reproduced and mediated through Detik.com news articles. As one of Indonesia's leading online news platforms, Detik.com had the highest weekly online news reach among the news brands surveyed in Indonesia in the *Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2025*, with 46% of respondents reporting weekly usage (Steele, 2025). Its prominent position in Indonesia's digital news landscape makes Detik.com a

relevant platform for examining how issues related to digital communication and democracy are represented in online news discourse. Consequently, its coverage of DFK may frame how the phenomenon is understood through particular lenses, including risk, control, and institutional accountability. In the articles examined, DFK is primarily presented as a threat to social order and democratic stability, with emphasis placed on the need for platform regulation. This framing foregrounds the government's regulatory perspective while giving comparatively limited attention to issues of public participation and freedom of expression, including concerns about the implications of greater state involvement in digital spaces.

This pattern reflects the broader role of news discourse in shaping how social reality is understood. Rather than simply reflecting reality, news discourse constructs representations through particular linguistic and contextual choices. White (2004) explains that the language in news reports contains evaluative elements that can influence how readers interpret events and issues, both explicitly and implicitly. Such evaluations can emerge through judgmental expressions, as well as through the selection of facts and the manner in which information is presented. Similarly, Belzile (2022) argues that absolute objectivity is difficult to achieve because journalists cannot completely detach themselves from their experiences and perspectives. Wahl-Jorgensen (2025) further describes journalism as a field involving the "politics of representation," in which journalists' perspectives influence how events and social actors are portrayed. Through word choice, narrative perspective, and the presentation of information, news discourse can foreground particular interpretations of an issue while giving less prominence to others. White (2004) notes that when news reports convey the assessments or responses of particular actors, they can foreground those actors' positions and evaluations. Such representation may contribute to the normalization of a particular perspective, especially when it is repeatedly presented as legitimate or reasonable.

Subjectivity is also embedded in the news production process. Steensen (2017) distinguishes between the writer's subjectivity, which relates to the journalist's perspective and the source's subjectivity, which stems from the news source's experiences and perspective. This distinction is highly relevant to this study because government officials and regulators are key sources in defining and discussing DFK in news coverage. While source subjectivity reflects the positions and interests of these actors, the selection, organization, and presentation of their statements by journalists can shape how these positions are represented in news discourse. Thus, examining evaluative language, positional framing, and subjectivity provides a basis for identifying which perspectives are foregrounded and how alternative perspectives may receive limited visibility.

This pattern of representation, which foregrounds institutional authority while marginalizing alternative perspectives on digital freedom and public participation, can be understood through the concept of hegemony as articulated by Ives (2004) in his interpretation of Antonio Gramsci's thought. Gramsci conceptualized hegemony as a form of domination maintained not only through coercion but also through ideological and cultural processes that secure the consent of subordinate groups and make dominant values appear to be *common sense* (Bates, 1975; Siswati, 2018). This process takes place primarily within civil society, including institutions such as the media, education, and cultural practices, where meanings are constantly produced and negotiated (Bates, 1975). Within this structure, intellectuals play a role in disseminating and reinforcing dominant ideologies that help secure the spontaneous consent of the masses (Kasiyarno, 2014). As a result, domination becomes less visible and increasingly normalized as dominant ideologies are accepted by individuals as *common sense*, rather than being recognized as mechanisms of control (Bates, 1975). However, hegemony is not a static condition but rather a dynamic process of negotiation and contestation (Siswati, 2018), in which dominant meanings can be both reproduced and challenged.

Building on Gramsci's perspective, Ives (2004) emphasizes the central role of language in the operation of hegemony. He argues that language is not merely a neutral medium of communication but a form of practical philosophy that shapes and reflects the collective worldview of social groups (Ives, 2004, p. 72). Through language, particular meanings can be constructed, standardized, and circulated, enabling ideological positions to be reproduced and accepted as *common sense*. Ives (2004, pp. 89-92) distinguishes between *normative grammar*, referring to institutionalized and regulated forms of language, and *spontaneous grammar*, which emerges through everyday social interaction. These concepts are related to fragmented *common sense*, understood as uncritical and inconsistent everyday beliefs, and *good sense*, which reflects a more coherent and critical understanding of reality (Ives, 2004, pp. 77, 96). Ives (2004, pp. 107-113) further connects hegemonic struggle to *war of manoeuvre*, characterized by direct confrontation, and *war of position*, involving gradual ideological negotiation within civil society. Together, these concepts highlight language as a site of ideological reproduction and contestation. Within media discourse, such processes operate through selection, emphasis, and framing, which can give particular perspectives greater visibility and legitimacy while limiting alternative viewpoints (Santi, 2012). Importantly, media institutions are not necessarily the original producers of the discourses they report. In this study, government and regulatory actors are positioned as the primary producers of DFK discourse, while Detik.com is examined as a mediating institution through which such discourse is selected, framed, reproduced, and potentially normalized.

Previous studies have examined various aspects of Detik.com's positioning, subjectivity, and representational practices regarding political and social issues. Regarding political representation, Adi Utama et al. (2023) examined Detik.com's coverage of the 2024 presidential election and found disproportionate attention given to Ganjar Pranowo, with such coverage contributing to a favorable representation of his candidacy. Meanwhile, Yaqin M.S. (2023) investigated Detik.com's coverage of Joko Widodo's political support for Prabowo Subianto and found that media ownership, as well as economic and political interests, influenced the construction of political narratives. In the context of national development, Aliyah et al. (2024) examined Detik.com's coverage of the IKN project and found that government officials and coalition political parties, including Golkar and PSI, were given more prominent coverage, while the voices of the opposition and criticism from indigenous communities received less attention. Similarly, Marsun et al. (2022) found that Detik.com adopted a pragmatic stance in its coverage of the IKN, aligning more closely with the prevailing power structure than providing space for critical public debate.

Other studies have focused on Detik.com's linguistic and representational strategies in reporting on social issues. Sandi et al. (2022) examined Detik.com's coverage of an attack on a political supporter and found that the repeated emphasis on the victim's identity and the details of the violence contributed to a dramatic representation of the event. Suryawati (2021) investigated "politainment" in Detik.com's portrayal of Mulan Jameela and found that political coverage emphasized personal and entertainment aspects more than her performance as a member of parliament. Yovita and Sulistyani (2025) examined Detik.com's coverage of discrimination against female athletes during the 2024 Olympics and identified a form of commodified advocacy, in which women's rights were presented through sensational and commercially valuable narratives. Hatta et al. (2025) also examined Detik.com's coverage of the *Makanan Bergizi Gratis* (MBG, Free Nutritious Meals) program and found a greater emphasis on technical and institutional aspects, such as proposed menus and official involvement, rather than on structural issues like stunting and the program's effectiveness. Overall, these studies show that Detik.com's news discourse involves processes of selection, emphasis, evaluation, and framing that may prioritize certain actors, perspectives, and interests, rather than simply presenting events as neutral information.

However, these studies have not specifically examined how the government's defined discourse on DFK is reproduced and

mediated through Detik.com's news coverage during periods of social unrest. This gap is particularly significant because the DFK discourse involves not only the representation of problematic digital content but also conflicting understandings of regulation, public participation, and freedom of expression. Thus, this study poses the following question: How does Detik.com reproduce and mediate the government's discourse on DFK through evaluative language, framing, and the representation of alternative perspectives in its coverage of the 2025 demonstrations?

Methodology

This study employs Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), adopting Fairclough's three-dimensional model to uncover the construction of hegemony in disinformation reporting on Detik.com. This approach was chosen because, according to Fairclough (1995), media discourse is not neutral but rather a social practice that is dialectically linked to power structures. Within this framework, language functions as an instrument to naturalize certain ideologies so that they are accepted as a common truth or hegemony (Fairclough, 2003). The analysis was conducted across three levels: micro (text), meso (discursive practices), and macro (sociocultural practices) (Munfarida, 2014).

At the micro level, this analysis focuses on linguistic features derived from Halliday's Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL), specifically transitivity, modality, and lexical choice (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2014), which have proven effective in revealing power relations within political and media discourse in Indonesia (Sueb & Wafa, 2025). Transitivity is examined to identify which actors are construed as active participants (Actor, Sayer) versus passive or affected participants (Goal, Sensed). Modality is examined to track the degree of certainty or commitment attached to particular claims. While, lexical choice is examined to identify evaluative and connotatively charged terms that portray specific actors or actions in a positive or negative light. Collectively, these analytical tools provide concrete textual evidence for the discursive construction of hegemony.

At the meso level, building upon the patterns of transitivity, modality, and lexical choice identified at the micro level, this study examines discursive practices in Detik.com's news production. The analysis draws on Steensen's (2017) distinction between authorial and source subjectivity, Belzile's (2022) account of journalistic subjectivity in news production, Wahl-Jorgensen's (2025) concept of the politics of representation, and White's (2004) explanation of evaluative language and reader positioning. Collectively, these elements are used to explore how journalists' editorial choices, regarding the sourcing, framing, and dissemination of statements from government and regulatory bodies, as well as which voices are included or excluded, reinforce specific hegemonic positions within news narratives.

At the macro level, these discursive practices are situated within broader sociocultural and sociopolitical contexts (Fairclough, 1995), drawing upon Gramsci's concept of hegemony as the naturalization of dominant ideology through consensus rather than coercion, as well as Ives's (2004) insights into the relationship between normative and spontaneous grammar in perpetuating hegemonic *common space,* to understand the interplay between news coverage and broader power structures in Indonesian society, while simultaneously revealing the media's role in either reproducing or challenging power dominance within the digital spaces.

The data of this study consist of five news articles published by Detik.com. These articles were selected through a systematic screening process based on their publication dates, relevance to disinformation, defamation, and hate speech (DFK), and thematic relevance to the 2025 demonstrations. A search was conducted on Detik.com for news published after the 2025 demonstrations within the specified research period. The initial search results were filtered to identify articles that specifically addressed DFK in relation to those demonstrations. Articles that did not directly address DFK or were irrelevant to the context of the demonstrations were excluded. Following this screening process, five articles

were identified as being directly relevant to the research focus. All five articles were written by the same journalist, a factor that was also considered in determining the dataset, as this study examines the patterns of discourse constructed across all directly relevant reports. These five articles constitute the primary data for the analysis.

The five selected articles are as follows: *"Wamenkomdigi Soroti Ramai Konten Live Ricuh Saat Demo DPR: Itu Tidak Real"* ("Deputy Minister of Communication and Digital Affairs Highlights the Proliferation of Live Content Showing Chaos During the DPR Protest: "That's Not Real"), *"KomDiGi 'Colek' TikTok hingga Meta Buntut Konten Disinformasi, Fitnah, dan Kebencian"* ("Ministry of Communication and Digital Affairs Calls Out TikTok and Meta Over Disinformation, Defamation, and Hate Speech"), *"Komisi I DPR Dukung Komdigi Panggil TikTok-Meta soal Ramai Konten Fitnah"* ("House of Representatives Commission I Supports Ministry of Communication and Digital Affairs' Summoning of TikTok and Meta Over Surge in Defamatory Content"), "*Anggota DPR Minta Akun Medsos Dibatasi: Jangan Ada Second Account"* ("House of Representatives Member Calls for Social Media Account Restrictions: No Second Accounts"), and *"DPR Usul Larang Warga Punya Second Account di Medsos"* ("House of Representatives Proposes Ban on Citizens Having Second Social Media Accounts"). Each article was assigned a code (A1-A5), while each paragraph and sentence was numbered sequentially. For example, A1/P3/S2 refers to the second sentence in the third paragraph of Article 1. Headlines were coded separately as A1/H, A2/H, and so forth.

The emphasis on textual data is grounded in the perspective of Titscher et al. (2000), who position text as the most concrete form of data in discourse analysis. Within this view, text is understood as a medium in which traces of social processes are "frozen," enabling researchers to reconstruct social realities through language. Accordingly, text is not merely a sequence of words, but a material representation that embodies ideologies, interests, and power relations within its linguistic structure. To support this analytical focus, a qualitative approach is adopted to capture the depth and complexity of meaning that often escapes reductionist quantitative methods. Unlike quantitative research, which relies on predefined categories, qualitative research is flexible and evolves dynamically throughout the research process. In this framework, texts are not treated as neutral entities, but as socially constructed forms laden with subjectivity. This approach enables the researcher to uncover how meaning is produced, negotiated, and interpreted within specific social contexts and discursive practices (De La Cuesta Benjumea, 2026).

The data collection process with a systematic search on the Detik.com search engine using the keywords "DFK," "disinformasi demo DPR" (disinformation regarding DPR protests), and "ujaran kebencian demo DPR" (hate speech regarding DPR protests), restricted to the period of August-September 2025, the time when demonstrations concerning DPR RI, (the Indonesian House of Representatives) allowances took place. This search yielded five articles meeting the criteria, encompassing the entirety of Detik.com's coverage that explicitly addressed DFK during that timeframe; no further filtering was applied, as all five articles directly addressed the topic and included statements from government officials or regulators responding to the protests. Coincidentally, all five articles were authored by the same journalist, a characteristic of the available data population rather than the result of deliberate sampling. This indirectly ensured that the individual journalistic style remained constant across the dataset, allowing recurring lexical and grammatical patterns to be understood as consistent discursive strategies rather than merely idiosyncratic authorial variations. Given that this dataset comprises the entire population of relevant coverage within the specified period, rather than a sample requiring selection criteria, no preliminary assessment regarding "hegemonic content" was made prior to analysis; the existence of hegemonic patterns could only be confirmed through the linguistic analysis detailed below.

Each of the five articles were segmented into clauses. Each clause was then analyzed using Halliday's SFL framework (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2014) through three stages. First, transitivity coding was conducted by

identifying process types (material, mental, verbal, and relational) and participant roles to determine which actors were linked to active, passive, or affected parties. Second, modality coding was performed by identifying modalities, such as *"diduga"* ("believed"), to assess the level of certainty within a claim. Third, lexical choice coding was carried out by identifying evaluative terms (e.g., *"memecah belah"* ("divisive"), *"menyesatkan"* ("misleading"), *"provokatif"* ("provocative"), based on their positive or negative value and the actors associated with them. The coding results from the five articles were then tabulated to identify recurring patterns among actors, process types, modalities, and lexical choices.

These micro-level patterns were then linked to meso-level discursive practices by examining source attribution in each article. The analysis focused on whether statements came from government officials or regulators or from other social actors, such as protesters and independent observers. Drawing on Steensen's (2017) distinction between writer's and source's subjectivity, Belzile's (2022) account of journalistic subjectivity, Wahl-Jorgensen's (2025) concept of the politics of representation, and White's (2004) account of evaluative language and reader positioning, the analysis examined whose voices were given prominence and whose were ignored or marginalized, as well as how these patterns were distributed across national and regional media.

Finally, the micro-level and meso-level findings were interpreted at the macro level using Fairclough's (1995) view of media as social practice, Gramsci's concept of hegemony, and Ives's (2004) account of *normative* and *spontaneous grammar*. This analysis examined how recurring linguistic patterns and source choices may contribute to presenting the government's definition of DFK as *common sense* within the broader socio-political context of the 2025 demonstrations.

Results and Discussion

1. Micro Level: Textual Analysis

At the micro-level, this analysis employs SFL-based coding regarding transitivity, modality, and lexical choices to examine how Detik.com's coverage of the 2025 protests represents social actors, digital platforms, and state regulations, and how these representations construct specific actors and claims as authoritative or legitimate, thereby providing a textual basis for interpreting the construction of hegemonic discourse in the subsequent discussion.

a. Delegitimization of Spontaneous Grammar within DFK Discourse

In this section, the analysis focuses on the first two articles: *"Wamenkomdigi Soroti Ramai Konten Live Ricuh Saat Demo DPR: Itu Tidak Real"* ("Deputy Minister of Communication and Digital Affairs Highlights the Proliferation of Live Content Showing Chaos During the DPR Protest: "That's Not Real") and *"KomDiGi 'Colek' TikTok hingga Meta Buntut Konten Disinformasi, Fitnah, dan Kebencian"* ("Ministry of Communication and Digital Affairs Calls Out TikTok and Meta Over Disinformation, Defamation, and Hate Speech").

Based on Fairclough's textual analysis, it was found that Detik.com frequently uses government-sourced terms that are negative in tone and formal in register. In the news reports, the public's digital activities during the protests were labeled as *"memecah belah"* ("divisive"), *"menyesatkan"* ("misleading"), *"provokatif"* ("provocative"), *"kericuhan"* ("riots"), *"palsu"* ("false"), *"fitnah"* ("slander"), and *"kebencian"* ("hatred").

(1) *...konten-konten mengenai aksi yang beredar itu sengaja dimunculkan untuk* ***memecah belah****.* (A1/P1/S2)

...the content circulating about the protests was deliberately created to be **divisive**.

(2) *Angga mendorong platform digital dapat mendeteksi otomatis konten-konten yang dihasilkan Artificial Intelligence (AI) agar informasi* ***menyesatkan*** *tidak mudah beredar. Terlebih, kata dia, jika konten itu bersifat* ***provokatif****.* (A1/P3/S1-S2)

Angga is pushing for digital platforms to automatically detect content generated by Artificial Intelligence (AI) so that **misleading** information does not spread easily. Moreover, he said, if the content is **provocative**.

(3) *Wakil Menteri Komunikasi dan Digital (Wamenkomdigi) Angga Raka Prabowo berencana memanggil pihak TikTok hingga Meta untuk membahas penyebaran konten palsu yang diduga memicu* ***kericuhan*** *demo.* (A2/P1/S2)

Angga Raka Prabowo, the Deputy Minister of Communication and Digital Affairs, plans to summon TikTok and Meta representatives to discuss the spread of fake content that is believed to have triggered the **riots** during the protests.

(4) *Kata Angga, aspirasi yang seharusnya bisa disampaikan dengan baik menjadi bias karena digiring oleh konten-konten* ***palsu*** *yang sengaja menebar* ***fitnah*** *dan* ***kebencian****.* (A2/P3/S2)

According to Angga, the concerns that should have been properly conveyed have been distorted by **false** content designed to spread **slander** and **hatred**.

Beyond these terms, Detik.com also reproduces Wamenkomdigi's (Deputy Ministry of Communication and Digital Affairs) own vocabulary, *"merusak"* ("undermine"), *"bias"* ("bias"), *"di-engineering"* (engineered), *"DFK"* (Disinformation, Defamation, and Hate Speech), *"AI"* ("AI"), *"nggak benar"* ("false"), *"palsu"* ("fake"), *"di-take down"* ("to take it down"), *"menindak"* ("take action"), and *"dicederai"* ("harmed"), as in the following statements.

(1) "Tadi saya bilang bahwa fenomena DFK (Disinformasi, Fitnah dan Kebencian) ini akhirnya ***merusak*** *sendi-sendi demokrasi. Misalnya teman-teman yang tadinya mau menyampaikan aspirasi, mau menyampaikan unek-uneknya, akhirnya menjadi* ***bias*** *ketika sebuah gerakan itu* ***di-engineering*** *oleh hal-hal yang, mohon maaf ya, yang* ***DFK*** *tadi," kata Angga di Kantor Komunikasi Kepresidenan (PCO), Jakarta, Selasa (26/8/2025).* (A1/P2/S1)

"Earlier I said that this phenomenon of DFK (Disinformation, Slander, and Hate) ultimately **undermines** the very foundations of democracy. For example, friends who originally wanted to voice their aspirations and concerns end up being **biased** when a movement is **engineered** by elements that, please excuse me, constitute **DFK**," said Angga at the Presidential Communications Office (PCO) in Jakarta on Tuesday (August 26, 2025).

(2) *"Nah ini yang kita dorong kepada platform. Harusnya dengan sistem mereka, mereka juga sudah bisa lihat, oh ini by* ***AI****, oh ini* ***nggak benar****, oh ini* ***palsu****. Harusnya sudah bisa langsung by sistem mereka udah langsung* ***di-take down****," ujar Angga.* (A2/P5/S1)

"This is what we're urging the platforms to do. Their systems should already be able to detect, oh, this is **AI**-generated, oh, this is **false**, oh, this is **fake**. Their systems should be able **to take it down** immediately," said Angga.

(3) *"Di sini kita tekankan sekali lagi kepada platform untuk juga memiliki sistem untuk* ***menindak*** *ini. Kita nggak mau demokrasi kita* ***dicederai*** *dengan hal-hal yang palsu gitu lho. Dibilangnya tadi misalnya ada bakar di sini, ternyata riilnya tidak ada kan. Itu kadang-kadang mungkin gerakan yang di tahun kapan dibikin terus dinarasikan," ujar Angga.* (A2/P7/S1-S3)

"Here, we emphasize once again to the platforms that they must also have a system to **take action** against this. We don't want our democracy to be **harmed** by fake news like that. For example, they said there was an arson attack here, but in reality, there wasn't one. Sometimes, perhaps a movement that was created in a certain year is then narrated," said Angga.

In addition, the use of the diction *'mencolek'* ('calls out') in the headline of the second article A2/H, *"Komdigi 'mencolek' TikTok hingga Meta..."* ("Ministry of Communication and Digital Affairs 'Calls Out' TikTok and Meta") functions as a euphemism. The term presents state intervention as light and non-confrontational, in contrast to the regulatory weight of measures involving content removal.

The texts also contain modal expressions that shape the epistemic status of the claims made. In the data A2/P1/S2, the claim that the false content *"...diduga memicu kericuhan"* ("...is believed to have triggered the riots") employs the epistemic marker *"diduga"* ("believed"), explicitly signalling the claim as unconfirmed. This hedge is not maintained elsewhere in the article, where the same content is referred to unqualified as *"palsu"* ("false") and *"provokatif"* ("provocative"). Separately, in Angga's statement urging platforms to take action as in the data (A2/P5/S1), *"Harusnya dengan sistem mereka, mereka juga sudah bisa lihat,... Harusnya sudah bisa langsung by sistem mereka udah langsung di-take down,..."* ("Their systems should already be able to detect,... Their systems should be able to take it down immediately,...") the modal *"harusnya"* "should" is used twice framing automatic detection and takedown as an expected obligations rather than as contested policy proposals.

Detik.com tends to position the state actor, Wamenkomdigi's (Deputy Ministry of

Communication and Digital Affairs), as an active agent through transitive constructions:

(1) *Angga mendorong platform digital dapat mendeteksi otomatis konten-konten yang dihasilkan Artificial Intelligence (AI)...* (A1/P3/S1)

Angga is pushing for digital platforms to automatically detect content generated by Artificial Intelligence (AI)...

(2) *"Saya pribadi, tadi sama Pak Dirjen juga, saya hubungi. Yang pertama, saya sudah hubungi Head TikTok Asia Pasifik, Helena. Saya minta mereka ke Jakarta,...* (A1/P6/S1-S3)

"Personally, I also contacted the Director General earlier. First, I contacted the Head of TikTok Asia Pacific, Helena. I asked them to come to Jakarta,…

(3) *Wakil Menteri Wakil Menteri Komunikasi dan Digital (Wamenkomdigi) Angga Raka Prabowo berencana memanggil pihak TikTok hingga Meta…* (A2/P1/S2)

Deputy Minister of Communication and Digital Angga Raka Prabowo plans to summon TikTok and Meta…

These constructions consistently position the state as the party driving the processes of detection, negotiation, and rule enforcement, while digital platforms and their content are cast as the parties passively undergoing these processes.

b. Institutional Solidarity in the Consolidation of Hegemonic War of Position

The analysis in this section focuses on the third article, titled *"Komisi I DPR Dukung Komdigi Panggil TikTok-Meta soal Ramai Konten Fitnah"* ("House of Representatives Commission I Supports Ministry of Communication and Digital Affairs' Summoning of TikTok and Meta Over Surge in Defamatory Content").

This article relies heavily on strong, authoritative verbs of alignment and enforcement, such as *"mendukung"* ("supports") and *"memanggil"* ("summon"), *"menindak"* ("take action"), *"menegaskan"* ("emphasize"), *"mengawal"* ("oversee"), and *"memperkuat"* ("strenghten").

(1) *"Komisi I DPR RI **mendukung** langkah Kementerian Komunikasi dan Digital untuk **memanggil** pihak platform seperti TikTok dan Meta. Platform digital harus bertanggung jawab secara sistemik, bukan hanya reaktif," kata Dave kepada wartawan, kamis (28/8/2025).* (A3/P2/S1)

"House of Representatives Commission I **supports** the Ministry of Communication and Digital Affairs' move to **summon** platforms such as TikTok and Meta. "Digital platforms must take systemic responsibility, not just react," Dave told reporters on Thursday (August 28, 2025).

(2) *…Dengan begitu, menurut dia, seharusnya penyedia platform dapat langsung **menindak**nya.* (A3/P3/S2)

…As such, he believes platform providers should be able to immediately **take action** against it.

(3) *Lebih lanjut, Dave **menegaskan** Komisi I DPR akan terus **mengawal** regulasi dan kebijakan yang **memperkuat** ekosistem digital yang sehat, aman, dan berkeadilan…* (A3/P7/S1)

Furthermore, Dave **emphasized** that House Commission I will continue to **oversee** regulations and policies that **strengthen** a healthy, safe, and equitable digital ecosystem…

By combining these terms, this news article constructs an image of a united political front, institutional resolve, and coordinated rule enforcement between the executive branch (Komdigi, Ministry of Communication and Digital Affairs) and the legislative branch (Komisi I DPR, House of Representatives Commission I).

Deontic modality is used to frame platform compliance as an obligation rather than merely a request. In the data A3/P2/S1, "*Platform digital harus bertanggung jawab secara sistemik,…"* ("Digital platforms must take systemic responsibility,…") employs a strong marker of obligation *"harus"* ("must"). Also, in the data A3/P3/S2, "…seharusnya penyedia platform dapat langsung menindaknya." ("should be able to immediately take action against it.") uses *"seharusnya"* ("should"), which similarly frames enforcement action by platforms as an expected standard rather than a negotiable policy position.

Furthermore, an analysis of the text's transitivity reveals a clear hierarchy of agency. State institutions, spesifically DPR (the House of Representatives) and Komdigi (the Ministry of Communication and Digital Affairs) are repeatedly positioned as subjects or active agents carrying out legal actions and

coordination, as in the data A3/P2/S1 *"Ketua Komisi I DPR mendukung langkah Kementrian Komunikasi dan Digital…"* (House of Representatives Commission I supports the Ministry of Communication and Digital Affairs'…"), thereby portraying the legislative branch as a source of legitimacy. In contrast, global digital platforms, TikTok and Meta, are positioned as passive objects that are the targets of such actions or oversight. Meanwhile, the public, the original creators of the content in question, are not depicted as actors within the sentence structure. Their voices surface only indirectly as the source of the defamatory content that must be dealt with.

c. Regulatory Escalation and the Disciplining of Common Sense through Discourses on Second Account Bans

The analysis in this final section of the micro-level focuses on the fourth and fifth articles, *"Anggota DPR Minta Akun Medsos Dibatasi: Jangan Ada Second Account"* ("House of Representatives Member Calls for Social Media Account Restrictions: No Second Accounts") and *"DPR Usul Larang Warga Punya Second Account di Medsos"* ("House of Representatives Proposes Ban on Citizens Having Second Social Media Accounts").

Lexically, this news text is dominated by words that indicate strict requirements and restrictions, *"menumpas"* ("combat"), *"jangan ada"* ("must not be"), *"dibatasi"* ("restricted"), *"harus"* ("must"), *"bertanggung jawab"* ("be held responsible"), *"melarang"* ("prohibiting"), and *"mewajibkan"* ("restricts").

(1) *Upaya Kementerian Komunikasi dan Digital (Komdigi)* ***menumpas*** *konten-konten disinformasi, fitnah dan kebencian di media sosial (medsos)... Dia juga usul agar akun medsos* ***dibatasi*** *dan* ***jangan ada*** *second account.* (A4/P1/S1-S2)

The Ministry of Communication and Digital Affairs' (Komdigi) efforts to **combat** disinformation, defamation, and hate speech on social media… He also proposed that social media accounts be **restricted** and there **must not be** secondary accounts.

(2) *"Batasi akun-akun media sosial. Batasinya caranya gimana, ya seperti China. China hari ini itu, jika ada warganya ingin membuat akun medsos,* ***harus*** *jelas. ID-nya, KTP-nya ini siapa. Kalau dia mau pakai yang lain, harus ada yang* ***bertanggung jawab****," lanjutnya.* (A4/P3/S1-S5)

"Limit social media accounts. How do you limit them? Well, just like in China. In China today, if a citizen wants to create a social media account, they **must** provide clear identification, their ID number and who they are. If they want to use a different account, someone must **be held responsible**," he continued.

(3) *Oleh juga mengusulkan ada aturan yang* ***melarang*** *pengguna memiliki akun samar atau 'seccond acount'.* (A4/P4/S1)

He also proposed a rule **prohibiting** users from having fake accounts or "second accounts.

(4) *Oleh juga menyinggung kebijakan pembatasan penggunaan medsos di China. Dia mengungkapkan pemerintah China* ***mewajibkan*** *warganya menggunakan identitas resmi saat membuat akun medsos.* (A5/P5/S1-S2)

He also touched on China's policies restricting social media use. He noted that the Chinese government **requires** its citizens to use their official identification when creating social media accounts.

The use of the term 'second account' as in the data A4/P1/S1-S2 in the text carries a negative connotation. It is consistently associated with anonymity, false identities, and the potential for defamation or information manipulation, rather than being presented as a neutral technical feature of social media platforms.

Deontic modality again frames state proposal as an absolute obligation rather than merely an open policy option. As in the data A4/P1/S1-S2, *"…jangan ada second account"* ("…there must not be secondary accounts") uses the prohibitive marker *"jangan"* ("must not"). And, as in the data A4/P3/S1-S5, "*…harus jelas.... harus ada yang bertanggung jawab,..."* ("...must be clear....must be held responsible,..." repeats *"harus"* ("must") twice within the same statement, reinforcing identity verification as a non-negotiable requirement rather than a debatable proposal.

Furthermore, members of parliament are positioned as active agents with the authority to regulate citizens' private behavior, as in the title of the fourth article A4/H, *"Anggota DPR minta akun medsos dibatasi..."* ("House of Representatives Member Calls for Social Media Account Restrictions…", where the *"Anggota DPR"* (House of the Representatives Member) acts as the Sayer/Actor issuing the statement or initiating the request, while the *"akun*

medsos" ("social media acoount") serves as the passive Goal being acted upon. Meanwhile, ordinary social media users are not portrayed as agents proposing or negotiating this policy. They appear merely as the passive targets whose behavior to be restricted and monitored.

2. Meso Level: Discursive Practices Analysis

At the meso level, this analysis examines the discursive practices surrounding the production and distribution of Detik.com news, drawing upon Steensen's (2017) distinction between authorial and source subjectivity, Belzile's (2022) account of journalistic subjectivity, Wahl-Jorgensen's (2025) concept of the politics of representation, and White's (2004) explanation of evaluative language and reader positioning. This dimension explores how the linguistic patterns identified at the micro level are shaped by, and in turn reinforce, editorial and institutional practices, thereby providing a discursive foundation for interpreting the construction of hegemony at the macro level, which is discussed subsequently.

a. News Production Routines: The Dominance of Source Subjectivity and the Politics of Representation

The lexical, modality, and transitivity patterns identified at the micro level can be understood in relation to consistent patterns in Detik.com's selection of news sources. Across the five articles, Detik.com relies primarily on statements from elite institutional sources, particularly Komdigi (the Ministry of Communication and Digital Affairs) and DPR (the House of Representatives). This pattern is relevant to Steensen's (2017) concept of "source subjectivity," which highlights how news content can reflect the experiences, judgments, and interests of news sources. Articles concerning Komdigi's summons of TikTok and Meta and Komisi I DPR's support for the measure were published just two days apart, on August 26 and August 28, 2025, respectively. Both articles reproduced a similar official narrative frame, with limited inclusion of additional institutional or alternative perspectives. Across the five articles, there are no direct quotes from civil society organizations, digital rights observers, protesters, or content creators. Instead, their positions appear only indirectly as the subject matter of officials' statements rather than as sourced perspectives in their own right.

Alongside this reliance on source subjectivity, writer's subjectivity (Steensen, 2017) is evident in how journalists select, sequence, and present official statements. The consistent use of transitive constructions that position state actors as active agents, as identified in the micro-level transitivity analysis, together with extended direct quotations from officials, gives greater textual prominence to institutional perspectives. In contrast, the perspectives of protesters, content creators, and civil society actors are represented mainly through summaries or receive no direct quotation. This pattern suggests that the organization and presentation of sources involve editorial judgments about which perspectives are given greater visibility, consistent with Belzile's (2022) argument that journalists cannot fully detach their reporting from their professional judgments about sources and newsworthiness.

This pattern reflects what Wahl-Jorgensen (2025) describes as the politics of representation in journalism. Rather than presenting DFK through a range of competing perspectives, Detik.com's reporting is structured predominantly around the state's framing of events, representing state actors as protective and proactive while positioning digital content and its creators as sources of "chaos" requiring correction. At the same time, affected users and independent observers receive comparatively limited textual space to articulate their perspectives on the events. In this way, source and writer subjectivity shape not only individual articles but also a recurring pattern of representation in which the state's framing is given greater prominence. This pattern provides a discursive basis for understanding how a particular interpretation of DFK can become normalized as a dominant perspective.

b. Distribution Strategies and Reader Interpellation toward National Common Sense

Discursive practices at the meso level also involve how this state-sourced framing is distributed across wider audiences. The fourth and fifth articles, which initially concerned a national-level proposal by a single DPR Member (House of Representatives Member), were republished through Detik.com's regional channels, detikjateng and detikbali, rather than appearing only through the national desk. This distribution potentially extends the reach of an elite-sourced framing across multiple regional audiences under the Detik.com network, allowing the same institutional perspective to circulate beyond the national news context.

White (2004) argues that news language carries evaluative elements that can influence how events are interpreted, both explicitly through evaluative wording and implicitly through the selection and presentation of information. Both mechanisms can be observed in this distribution pattern. Explicitly, the repeated circulation of negatively loaded terms identified at the micro level, such as *"memecah belah"* ("divisive"), *"menyesatkan"* ("misleading"), and *"provokatif"* ("provocative"), together with the deontic modals *"harus"* ("must") and *"seharusnya"* ("should"), presents compliance as necessary or obligatory. Implicitly, the reports on proposed restrictions on secondary accounts give little attention to alternative concerns, such as citizens' privacy rights.

Furthermore, White (2004) notes that when news repeatedly foregrounds the assessments of particular actors without giving comparable space to others, those perspectives may become normalized as dominant or reasonable interpretations of events. The consistency of this pattern, the recurring reliance on the same institutional sources and evaluative framing across both national and regional channels, gives greater prominence to the state's interpretation of the proposed restrictions, while alternative perspectives remain comparatively less visible. The repetition of this framing across channels therefore contributes to its wider circulation within Detik.com's news network, extending an institutional interpretation beyond individual articles or national coverage.

3. Macro Level: Sociocultural Practices Analysis

At the macro level, this analysis interprets the discursive practices identified at the meso level within Indonesia's broader socio-political context, drawing on Gramsci's concept of hegemony and Ives's (2004) account of *war of position*, *normative* and *spontaneous grammar*, and the distinction between *common sense* and *good sense*. This dimension examines how Detik.com, as a mediating institution rather than the original producer of DFK discourse, contributes to naturalizing government and regulatory actors' framing as legitimate and taken-for-granted, thereby situating the discursive construction of hegemony within the wider socio-political landscape of post-demonstration Indonesia.

a. The Situational Context of Post-Demonstration Political Anxiety in Crisis Management

Situationally, Detik.com's series of reports on restrictions in cyberspace cannot be separated from the political context following the wave of large-scale demonstrations around the DPR (House of Representatives) building. In the current sociopolitical context, social media platforms such as TikTok, X, and Instagram serve not only as a means of entertainment but have also become political spaces and effective tools for mass mobilization among subaltern groups or ordinary citizens. Live streaming features and the use of anonymous secondary accounts allow protest participants to share real-time documentation of official actions, mobilize legal or medical assistance, and construct alternative narratives without needing to pass through the filtering process of mainstream media.

For the government, this organic, rapid, and difficult-to-control flow of information is viewed as a threat to national stability because it has the potential to undermine political legitimacy and public trust in state institutions. In this crisis situation, discourse at the macro

level was then produced to stabilize the situation. The official statement from Kementerian Komdigi (Ministry of Communication and Digital Affairs), supported by DPR (the House of Representatives), regarding the presence of DFK content during the demonstrations, can be understood as a politically constructed effort to respond to and defuse the situation. This institutional framing is reflected at the meso level in the near-exclusive reliance on these two sources and the rapid republication of their statements identified above.

By using Detik.com as the primary medium for disseminating information, the government is attempting to divert public attention from the substance of the demonstrators' demands and the issue of state repression toward the dangers of hoaxes and digital disinformation. This diversion is achieved, at the textual level, through the very lexical and modal patterns identified at the micro level: labeling protest-related content as *"menyesatkan"* ("misleading") and *"provokatif"* ("provocative"), and framing platform compliance as an unquestioned obligation through *"harus"/"seharusnya"* ("must"/"should"), rather than through any comparable engagement with the demonstrators' underlying demands. In this situational context, the discourse regarding the ban on secondary accounts and restrictions on live-streaming content can be understood as part of the government's crisis management strategy. This strategy aims to regain control over the flow of information, which had previously been heavily influenced by civil society movements through digital media.

b. Institutional and Cultural Contexts in the Formation of a New Hegemony through Consent

Institutionally and culturally, Indonesia's current sociopolitical landscape reflects a shift in the state's strategy to maintain its hegemony in the era of digital democracy. Whereas in the past the state relied more on physical force or direct coercion, such as dispersing demonstrations or taking repressive actions against activists, these strategies are now considered less effective in the digital space. Acts of violence openly visible in cyberspace have the potential to trigger public condemnation, expand digital solidarity, and accelerate the erosion of the government's legitimacy. Consequently, the state tends to employ more subtle cultural strategies, namely building public consent through mainstream media.

From the perspective of Ives (2004), who draws on Gramsci's thought, the structured efforts by Komdigi (Ministry of Communication and Digital Affairs), supported by DPR (House of Representatives) to regulate the internet and propose a ban on secondary accounts can be understood as an escalation of the *war of position* in the realm of knowledge. The state recognizes that control over civil society also depends on control over cultural institutions that produce knowledge. Through media outlets such as Detik.com, which has a wide readership, narratives regarding the threats of hoaxes, slander, and potential social disintegration associated with anonymous accounts are repeatedly disseminated. This pattern corresponds to the meso-level finding that an elite-sourced framing was circulated from national coverage to regional channels such as detikjateng and detikbali, with limited introduction of alternative sources or perspectives, thereby fostering moral panic in the public spaces.

The aim of this process is to shape public consciousness so that people voluntarily consent to the idea that strengthening digital controls and restricting certain privacy rights are rational measures necessary for the common good. When the public accepts and justifies these policies without significant resistance, the state succeeds in embedding *normative grammar,* visible at the micro level in the recurring evaluative lexis and deontic modals used to describe both citizens' digital activity and platforms' obligations, into the collective *common sense*. Consequently, disciplinary actions in the digital space are no longer perceived as a form of restriction on civil liberties, but rather as measures deemed reasonable and procedurally legitimate for the sake of maintaining social harmony.

c. Sociocultural Implications of the Weakening of Good Sense and the Decline of Digital Democracy

The sociocultural impact of the convergence between the state's political interests and the discursive framework of Detik.com is the weakening of the potential for critical awareness to emerge within society. When the state succeeds in normalizing the narrative that digital anonymity is the primary source of defamation and criminality, a narrative built, as shown at the micro level, through the consistently negative lexical framing of "second account" and, at the meso level, through the near-total absence of directly sourced protester or civil-society voices to counter that framing, a psychosocial impact emerges in the form of increased fear of self-expression. Under these conditions, the digital space, which was originally expected to be a democratic public space, shifts into a more controlled space, where individuals feel monitored by dominant norms of power (*normative grammar*).

Ives (2004) emphasizes that social change and resistance movements by subaltern groups or ordinary people can only occur if unstructured everyday experiences (*spontaneous grammar*) are transformed by organic intellectuals into good sense. Unlike *common sense*, which tends to be passive and rife with prejudice, *good sense* is a form of political consciousness that is more critical, coherent, rational, and organized to recognize and respond to structures of oppression.

With the loss of spaces of anonymity such as secondary accounts, the state effectively restricts the space for this process of knowledge transformation. Alternative accounts, which previously served as a means for the public to voice injustices without the risk of criminalization, are now subject to restrictions. As a result, consistent with the source and distribution patterns traced from the micro through the meso level above, the public tends to be positioned within a fragmented *common sense*, accompanied by anxiety, and is more likely to accept a single truth originating from authority. On a macro level, this analysis shows that the discourse on disinformation produced by mainstream media can function as an ideological instrument that plays a role in maintaining the status quo, while also signalling a serious challenge to the development of digital democracy in Indonesia.

Conclusion

This study set out to examine how Detik.com's coverage of the August-September 2025 DPR demonstrations linguistically constructs and discursively mediates the government's DFK narrative. Drawing on Fairclough's three-dimensional model together with Gramsci's concept of hegemony as operationalized by Ives (2004), the analysis identifies a consistent pattern across the three levels: linguistic choices at the textual level, source selection and distribution practices at the discursive level, and their broader sociopolitical implications collectively foreground the state's authority while giving comparatively limited visibility to alternative perspectives. The significance of this pattern lies in providing a concrete, text-based account of how hegemonic discourse may be constructed and normalized, even without direct evidence of audience uptake. Rather than treating hegemony as a purely abstract or assumed outcome, the findings identify specific linguistic and institutional mechanisms through which one interpretation of events is repeatedly given greater prominence and may become normalized as a dominant, taken-for-granted perspective.

At the micro level, the analysis found a consistent use of lexical choice and modality to differentiate the representation of state actors and the public. Digital activities associated with users and content are repeatedly characterized through negatively loaded terms such as *"menyesatkan"* ("misleading") and *"provokatif"* ("provocative"), while deontic modals such as *"harus"* ("must") and *"seharusnya"* ("should") frame corrective action as necessary. In contrast, state actors are predominantly represented through active, agentive constructions as actors responsible for responding to and restoring social order. This pattern provides the textual basis for the discursive and sociopolitical interpretations discussed below.

At the meso level, these textual patterns correspond to identifiable practices of source selection, quotation, and content distribution. Across all five articles, direct and extended quotations are used almost exclusively for government and regulatory officials, while demonstrators, content creators, and civil society actors are not directly quoted and appear mainly as subjects of officials' statements. The same officially sourced framing is also redistributed from national to regional channels, including detikjateng and detikbali, with no additional regional sources identified in the dataset. These patterns are directly observable in the data through source selection, quotation distribution, and republication across channels, rather than through claims about newsroom intent or production pressures, which cannot be established from this text-based dataset.

At the macro level, these textual and discursive patterns, when considered together, are consistent with what Ives (2004), following Gramsci, describes as *a war of position*: an ideological strategy conducted through civil institutions such as the media rather than through direct coercion. The consistent absence of civil-society and demonstrator voices as directly sourced perspectives, combined with the redistribution of a single official framing across regional channels, creates discursive conditions in which the state's interpretation can be circulated as *normative grammar* or *common sense*, while alternative interpretations have limited space to develop as *spontaneous grammar* or *good sense*. This finding should therefore be understood as evidence of a textually grounded potential for hegemonic effect, rather than as evidence of achieved hegemonic consent or a demonstrated outcome in public consciousness, which this study's design does not measure.

Taken together, these findings demonstrate how Fairclough's three-dimensional model can be operationalized through explicit linguistic tools, including SFL transitivity, modality, and lexical choice at the textual level, and connected to Ives's (2004) linguistically grounded account of hegemony at the sociopolitical level. By linking textual patterns with source selection, quotation, and distribution practices, the study provides a text-based framework for examining how dominant interpretations may be reproduced and normalized in Indonesian media discourse. This approach also contributes to a more concrete understanding of hegemony by identifying the linguistic and discursive mechanisms through which particular perspectives are given greater visibility, rather than treating hegemonic discourse as an abstract or assumed outcome.

This study nevertheless has several limitations. The analysis is based on only five Detik.com articles, all written by a single journalist, which allows journalistic style to remain relatively constant but limits the extent to which the findings can be generalized to Detik.com's broader reporting or Indonesian news media more generally. In addition, the study relies solely on published news texts and therefore cannot establish newsroom production processes, journalists' intentions, or audience responses. Future research could address these limitations by examining a larger and more diverse corpus involving multiple journalists, media outlets, and longer time periods, as well as comparing outlets with different editorial orientations. Audience-reception methods, including interviews, surveys, or analysis of reader engagement and comments, could also determine whether the hegemonic patterns identified in the present study are taken up, resisted, or reinterpreted by audiences, thereby addressing the distinction between discursive potential and confirmed audience effects.

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